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LEGISLATION NOTES
NEW CONSUMER CREDIT REFORMS IN ILLINOIS
Since Hammurabi's written code of law,' organized societies have recog-
nized the need to provide the consumer with legislative protection from the
unscrupulous seller or lender. Initially this protection came in the form of
usury laws prohibiting the extraction of excessive interest charges. 2 This
early concern for the consumer is reflected in the Bible, which repeatedly
condemns usurious practices with money lending,3 the only form of consumer
credit then in existence. In early Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence interest was
totally prohibited,4 but this restriction was later relaxed permitting lenders to
charge up to ten percent interest and thus allowing some flow of credit.,
Today all states have usury statutes regulating interest rates, ranging from
six percent per annum in Delaware to twenty-one percent per annum in
Rhode Island.
7
It was through these ursury statutes that legislatures first recognized the
inadequacy of competition alone to regulate a seller's behavior. A consumer's
immediate and dire need, ignorance, or other factors have often led to a break-
down of the market function and placed him in an unequal bargaining
position. To prevent an unscrupulous seller from taking advantage of a con-
sumer's misfortune, the ordinary forces of supply and demand needed to be
supplemented with legislation such as ceilings on interest charges. But as
commerce increased, the consumer's need for protection took on additional
dimensions. Often these new needs were slow to be recognized because of the
legislature's hesitancy to tamper with free trade. However, a variety of legis-
lation was gradually enacted to help equalize the consumer's position.
1 WI GMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 88-90 (West's ed. 1928).
2 For an historical analysis of usury see NEIFELD, MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT
(1961).
3 Deuteronomy 23:19,20: "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of
money, usury of victuals, usury of anything lent upon usury." See also Leviticus 25:35-37.
For references to the New Testament see generally Smith, Usury in the New Testament,
20 P es. Fix. L.Q. 79 (1966).
4 11 Hen. 7, c. 8 (1495).
537 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545). See generally Berger, Usury In Installment Saks, 2 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 148 (1935).
6 DEL. CODE ANN. it. 6, § 2301 (Supp. 1966).
.7 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-26-2 (Supp. 1966). See generally CURRAN, TRENDS x
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 226-43 (1965).
LEGISLATION NOTES
The first of these measures was the small loan acts. Usury statutes had all
but obliterated the legitimate small loan business because such a business
could not be carried on profitably within the prescribed rates. Therefore, these
acts were passed in all states, except Arkansas, 8 to provide exceptions to the
usury statutes and to attract legitimate lenders into a field then totally dom-
inated by loan-sharks.
An unfortunate English case9 distinguished between the lending of money
and the extension of vendor's credit, holding that only the former came within
the provisions of the usury statute. This view was followed by a majority of
American courts, 10 leaving consumer credit, extended for the sale of goods,
totally without regulation. To fill this gap many states passed retail install-
ment sales acts, the first being Indiana in 193511 followed by Wisconsin
during the same year.' 2 By 1965, only eight states had not enacted some form
of a retail installment sales act, 13 and the other states had acts which varied
greatly in severity and application. 14 In general, these acts concern themselves
with regulation of interest and finance charges, mandatory disclosure of
certain key terms, and prepayment controls. They are a substantial improve-
ment over the unprotected situations of the past, but their coverage has been
slow and sporadic. 15 Illinois, for example, did not pass its retail installment
sales act until 1957.16
To supplement the retail installment sales act, Illinois passed a Consumer
Fraud Act, 17 designed to prevent abuses centered around misleading adver-
8 CURRAN, supra note 7, at 16.
9 Bette v. Bindgood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827) where the court initiated the time
sales doctrine stating that the seller may charge one price for a cash sale and a higher
price for a sale with payments extended. This activity was said not to be within the
usury statute because it was neither a loan nor a forbearance.
1oSee Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861). See generally 91 C.J.S. Usury
§ 18 (1955), 55 Amr. JuR. Usury § 21 (1946).
11 Ind. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 231.
12 Wis. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 479.
13 Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming. See generally CCH INSTAL. CRED. GumE.
14 See generally CURRAN, supra note 7, at 254-255; Hogan, A Survey of State Retail
Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958); Ziegel, Retail Installment Sales Legislation: A
Historical and Comparative Survey, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 143 (1962) (comparing legis-
lation in Canada, U.S., Eng., and Australia); Note, Retail Installment Sales Legislation,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 854 (1958).
15 Jordan, Consumer Credit: Some of the Major Problem Areas in Modern Consumer
Credit Statutes, 20 PERs. FiN. L.Q. 13 (1965).
16 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121'2, 223 (1965). See Britton and Ulrich, The Illinois Retail
Installment Sales Act-Historical Background and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L.
REv. 137 (1958). The Illinois Act was recently amended by the 75th Illinois General
Assembly (1967), S.B. 28.
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/, §§ 261-71 (1965).
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tising, chain referral sales, and the consequences of violation.' 8 In July, 1967,
the Act was then amended to curb some of the more serious abuses. Included
in the new amendments is a home solicitation provision and new requirements
limiting negotiation of consumer paper. These new provisions are a significant
advance in providing adequate consumer protection and a bold step toward
balancing the market positions of consumer and merchant.
The use of consumer credit has immensely expanded in recent years, bring-
ing about the need for regulatory legislation such as "truth-in-lending" bills. 19
This increased use of credit also brought about an increase in consumer
buying and consequently the need for controlling not only lending practices
but also selling methods and procedures. The viciousness of fraudulent sales
practices today are far greater than the old "con games," which have always
been legislated against, because they affect not only the present wealth of
the individual but also his future earnings. Unscrupulous business practices
most frequently victimize the poor, for it is they who are most gullible and
who most often fall for the sophisticated high pressure selling techniques.20
In fact, current Illinois law places the consumer at a disadvantage, espe-
cially those laws which allow confessions of judgment 2' and negotiation
of consumer paper. 22
Unscrupulous practices often rely entirely upon judicial enforcement for
their effectiveness. For example, an itinerant salesman can pressure a person
into buying something he neither needs nor can afford and can have him
sign a contract containing a cognovit clause. The salesman can then con-
fess judgment on the contract if the buyer defaults. The only procedure
then open to the buyer is to petition the court to open the judgment by
proving he has a defense.2 3 Usually the victim neither has the money nor
the knowledge necessary to pursue this possibility, so he reluctantly pays.
Then too, a merchant can discount a promissory note given as payment with
a finance company immmediately after the sale is consummated. The finance
company then becomes the holder in due course, taking the note free of
any defense the consumer may have against the seller, save, for example,
fraud in the execution, forgery, or alteration. 24 The consumer must pay on
his note despite non-delivery of the goods or other failure of consideration.
18 1LL. REV. STAT. ch. 121Y2, §§ 262A, 263-71 (1965).
19 See generally Note, Consumer Credit-Proposed Truth-in-Lending Legislation, 16
DE PAUL L. REV. 464 (1967).
20 See generally Willging, Installment Credit: A Social Perspective, 15 CATHOLIC UL.
REV. 45 (1966).
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8, 50 (1965).
22 1LL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-105(b) (1965).
23 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-110, §50(4) (1965).
2 4 UNnUORM COMIAERCIAL CODE §§ 3-305, 3-401, 3-407.
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To equalize the consumer's position, positive legislation was needed beyond
"truth-in-lending" laws.
25
The 1967 Illinois amendments to the Consumer Fraud Act grant the
consumer the right to rescind a sales contract made with a door-to-door
salesman. They also place additional requirements on a transferee of a
consumer's promissory note from becoming a holder in due course, if such
note was used as payment of the purchase price. The purpose of this note
is to explore the nature and extent of these amendments and to analyze
their effectiveness in light of recent similar legislation.
HOME SOLICITATION PROVISION OF THE AMENDMENTS TO ILLINOIS
CONSUMER FRAUD ACT
The most significant and radically new provision is the granting to the
consumer of the right to cancel any sale of consumer goods made by a seller
who has made an unsolicited call at the buyer's residence. 26 No traditional
defense such as fraud or failure of consideration need be present. The
mere fact that the impetus of the purchase came solely from the salesman
is considered sufficient reason to afford the buyer time to reflect until a
later date. This provision recognizes the disparity of positions between the
high pressure, fast talking professional and the unsuspecting resident. The
sale must merely be to a consumer and be a sale of "merchandise," defined
as including all goods, services, and real estate situated outside of Illinois.27
There is no requirement that the merchandise be sold under a contract
calling for installment payments, 28 but rather, specifically states it is ap-
plicable whether the goods are sold under a single or multiple contract. The
merchandise must have a price of at least fifty dollars in order for the
buyer to have the right to cancel.2 9 The consumer need merely notify the
seller of his intention to avoid the sale within three full business days and
return any merchandise delivered to him.
Illinois is not unique in providing a "cooling off" period. The earliest
such provision in the United States was included in Pennsylvania's Home
25 Some authorities have suggested regulation through uses of equity powers. See
Alexander, Fraudulent Installment Sales In Chicago, 41 Cmi. BAR REc. 285 (1960).
26111. Laws, 75th Gen. Ass. (1967), S.B. 25, § 2B, approved July 26, 1967 (hereinafter
cited as Ill. S.B. 25).
27 Ill. S.B. 25, § 1(b).
28 Massachusetts, Georgia, Vermont, and Hawaii all require the contract to call for
installment payments. See notes 32 and 34 inlra.
29 Vermont has a twenty-five dollar minimum, the only state which is lower. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454 (3 CCH INSTAL. CRED. GUIDE 1 1 1121-47).
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Improvement Act in 1963.30 Michigan adopted a similar provision in 1965
which was modeled after the Pennsylvania Act.31 However, these acts were
very limited in scope, applying only to relatively expensive items of three
hundred dollars or more which were to be installed by the seller and were
to become a permanent fixture of the home. Although preceded by some
Canadian provinces,32 Massachusetts passed the first act of general appli-
cation in the United States in 1966. This act allowed cancellation if a
substantial part of the goods or service were neither delivered nor tendered,
and the sale was consummated at a place other than at the seller's address.33
Three other states, Georgia, Hawaii, and Vermont have followed the example
of Massachusetts and passed home solicitation provisions in 1967, before
Illinois enacted its statute.34
A Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Its purpose is to
replace existing state laws regulating consumer credit, retail installment
sales, and small loans and to substitute in all states a uniform code. The
drafters of the second tentative draft of this "Uniform Consumer Credit
Code" also included a provision for "Home Solicitation Sales." This provi-
sion is intended to apply to any credit installment sale of one hundred dol-
lars or more where the seller engages in face-to-face solicitation at the home
of the buyer.35
Under the Massachusetts Acts, a door-to-door salesman who can carry the
commodity with him can easily avoid the "cooling off" restriction by deliver-
ing or tendering the goods immediately upon execution of the contract. How-
ever, under the Illinois statute, neither delivery nor tender of delivery re-
moves the sale from the effects of the Act. Therefore, in addition to the giving
of notice, the buyer must return to the seller, "in its original condition,"
any merchandise delivered to him under the contract or sale in order to
avoid the contract.36 This requirement appears to be a condition precedent
30 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-203 (Supp. 1966).
3 1 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.417 (202(C)) (Supp. 1966).
32 A home solicitation provision was included in Manitoba's "Consumer Credit Act,"
STAT. OF MAN., 14 Eliz. 11, 1965 ch. 15, §§ 6-11. See also Hughes, Conditional Sales
and Consumer Protection, 2 MAN. L. REV. 15 (1966). This was followed by Ontario,
14 & 15 Eliz. 11, ch. 23 (1966); Alberta, STAT. OF ALTA. 1966, ch. 28; Nova Scotia,
STAT. OF N. S., ch. 5, § 15 (repealed STAT. OF N. S. 1967 ch. 98).
33 MASS. GEN . LAWS ch. 255 D, § 14 (1966). See also Wilkins, The New Massachusetts
Retail Installment Sales Act, 51 MASS. L.Q. 205, 228-33 (1966).
34 UNIFoRM CONSUMa CREDIT CODE § 2.501 (Tentative Draft, 1966).
35 Ga. Laws 1967, Act No. 413 (1A CCH INSTAL. CRED. GUIDE ff1[ 1202-51); Vt. Laws
1967, fit. 9, ch. 69 (3 CCH INSTAL. CRE. GUIDE J T 1121-47, 1160-65); Hawaii Laws
1967, Act No. 285 (1A CCH INSTAL. CraE. GUIDE UII 1101-37).
36 In. S.B. 25 § 2B.
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to the right of cancellation. But although return of the merchandise is essen-
tial, it should not be construed as a condition precedent but rather as a
concurrent condition either to redeliver or to hold the goods for the seller's
benefit. Often redelivering is expensive or impossible. If cancellation could
only be accomplished by first redelivering the goods, the effectiveness of the
Act would be greatly curtailed since an unscrupulous seller of bulky items
could merely deliver the goods after consummation of the sale. A consumer
might then be hesitant to bear the expense of reshipment and would likely
be forced to comply with a contract that he would have otherwise have
cancelled.
To be within the provisions of the Illinois Act the sale must have resulted
from an unsolicited call or contract at the buyer's residence. No protection
is given to a sale consummated at any other place. This limits the scope of
protection from itinerant salesmen considerably more than other similar acts.
For example, the Massachusetts provision extends protection to include any
sale not made at the seller's address.37 This however appears to be too broad,
for it includes sales made at the buyer's office or place of business, as long
as the sale was made under a retail installment sales contract. Vermont
goes even further and allows rescission of any retail installment transac-
tion as long as a substantial portion of the goods have not been received. 38
British Columbia has the most realistic and detailed provision defining
the scope of protection. This act grants the right of rescission to "all con-
tracts of fifty dollars or more of which payment of full consideration. is
not made at the time of contracting" and then lists numerous exceptions.3 9
These exceptions are designed to exempt from the act, sales made in the
ordinary course of trade, sales made to persons not needing protection, or
sales of perishable goods which by their nature do not lend themselves to
a right of rescission.
3 7 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 14 (Supp. 1966).
38 Vt. Laws 1967, tit. 9, ch. 69, § 2453 (3 CCH INSTAL. CRED. GUIDE I 1121-47, 1160-
65).
39 STAT. OF B. C. 1967, ch. 14, § 4. "This part does not apply:
a) to a contract solicited, negotiated or concluded at
(i) the seller's or salesman's normal business premises, or
(ii) a market place, auction, trade fair, agricultural fair, or exhibition;
b) to a contract for the sale of goods being purchased for resale;
c) to a contract under which a retailer is the buyer of goods intended to be used
in his business but not for resale;
d) to a contract under which a buyer is a corporation;
e) to a contract negotiated, solicited and made without any dealings in person between
the seller and the buyer or any salesman and the buyer; or
f) to a contract under which the goods to be delivered consist only of food or food
products in a perishable state at the time of delivery; or
g) to a contract solicited, negotiated, or concluded by a seller or a salesman of the
seller who occasionally carries on business outside of his permanent place of
business located in a commercial premises in the Provinces."
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Notice need not be given in Illinois in any particular manner nor need
it be in writing. The consumer has three full business days following the day
the transaction was completed, the longest period of any act. The period
does not begin to run until he is supplied with an address or phone number
at which such notice to seller can be given. All other states which have
home solicitation acts require written notice by certified mail postmarked
either by five P.M. or midnight depending upon the act.40 In these cases
notice is deemed effective when mailed. Since Illinois is most liberal as to
the manner that notice may be served, notice by mail will most probably
be construed, in Illinois, as effective when sent especially since the purpose
of the provision is to protect the consumer, not the seller.
CONSEQUENCES OF CANCELLATION
The Illinois Act is not very explicit as to the effects of rescinding a con-
tract. It merely states that if the required notice is given and the mer-
chandise is returned, the seller is required to return any payment made or
consideration given. It should be noted that the seller has the right to have
his goods in their original condition. But the sales contract is totally void,
relieving both parties from further liability. No fines or liquidated damages
are imposed on the buyer for exercising his right to avoid the contract.
In contrast, Georgia allows the seller the "right to charge buyer five percent
of the gross sales price of the merchandise, or twenty-five dollars, which-
ever is less, as liquidated damages." 4'
Merchandise is defined by the Illinois Act as including services, yet the
Act is silent as to whether the right of cancellation still exists after the
services have been partially or fully performed. Georgia's Act specifically
prohibits such cancellations. 42 This enables fraudulent repairmen to run
rampant as long as the services are rendered immediately. An adequate
compromise would be to allow the consumer to avoid liability for the contract
price but require him to pay fair market value for the work performed.
Custom made goods, or goods which have been so altered so as to make
them unfit for resale, should also be exempt from right of cancellation. 43
Although some risk to the consumer will result, the injury to seller by
allowing cancellation would be greatly disproportionate to the protection
granted. In Illinois however, the seller can protect himself, as he can in
40 E.g., Ga. Laws 1967, Act No. 473, § 6(a) approved April 18, 1967 (1A CCH
INSTAL. CRED, GUIDE 1 1202).
4 1 Id. at § 6(d).
42 1d. at § 6(e).
4 3 E.g., id.
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Massachusetts, by merely waiting for the expiration of the "cooling off"
period since in Illinois this period begins upon execution of the contract if
the seller's address or phone number is supplied to the consumer.
CRITICISMS OF THE ILLINOIS PROVISION
Although the Illinois amendment is a welcome step in retreat from our
historical position of caveat emptor and provides well needed protection, it
does have shortcomings. For one, the scope of protection given the con-
sumer from transient solicitation is far too narrow. People lay prey to the
professional salesman at many places other than their residence. It would
be far more effective to extend protection to as many areas as, for example,
British Columbia's Act 44 which represents a realistic balance between buyer's
need for protection and seller's right to have his contract enforced as made.
Also, notice that such rights exist should be required to be given in the
mandatory disclosure provisions of the contract itself; for, the people who
would most need this protection would probably be ignorant of the fact
that this right exists.
45
Another improvement would be to extend the right of cancellation for
non-receipt of the goods to include a right to rescind the contract after the
three day limit has expired. This new provision could be modeled after the
British Columbia Act which provides that if the goods are not delivered
within thirty days of the date specified in the contract, or within 120 days
if none is specified, the buyer has the right to rescind the contract even
though the three day period has elapsed. 46 Added to this should be a provi-
sion such as Georgia has which requires the buyer to pay actual costs, up
to fifty dollars, for pick-up of the goods if delivered. 47 This seems to be a
realistic attempt to restore both parties to their original position without the
seller taking advantage of the situation.
A further flaw is that the Illinois Act makes no special mention of how
to handle trade-ins. Although they must be returned since they constituted
part of the consideration given, credit should be allowed to the seller for
any reasonable expense incurred, by making the trade-in ready for resale.
Conversely, the seller should be made to bear extra liability if the goods
are not redelivered to the consumer in the same condition as given.48 Also,
44MASS. GEw. LAWS ch. 255(D), § 14 (1966).
45 Manitoba's Consumer Credit Act required that every contract shall "clearly and
conspicuously state" that the purchaser may serve notice on the vendor and thereby
cancel the contract. STAT. OF MAN. 1965, 14 Eliz. 11, ch. 15, § 7(1).
4 6 STAT. OF B. C., 1967, ch. 14, § 7(3).
47 Ga. Laws 1967, Act No. 473, § 6(E), supra note 35.
4SMAS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255(D), § 14(C) (1966).
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a time limit in which to make the return of the consideration given should
also be included to increase the certainty of the consequences of rescission. 49
LIMITATION OF THE STATUS OF A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
A second important provision in providing consumer protection of the
new amendments to the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act is the attempt to pre-
vent finance companies from becoming holders in due course of consumer
paper.50 This recognizes the idea that the consumer's defense against the
seller should be preserved. In the past, despite flagrant misrepresentation,
fraud, or non-delivery, the buyer would remain legally liable to the finance
company on his promissory note, leaving as his only recourse an action against
the seller who frequently could not be found or who had since gone bankrupt.
The new provisions add two new elements to the traditional requirements
needed to become a holder in due course. However, they are applicable only
if a negotiable instrument is given' by a consumer as payment for merchandise
other than a motor vehicle before such merchandise is delivered. In such
cases, negotiation ,of the instrument will not bar the consumer from assert-
ing any personal defense unless the contract contains a printed "notice to
the buyer" informing him of his right to give the seller notice of a defense
within five days after delivery of the merchandise and such notice is not
given by the consumer.51 If such "notice to the buyer" is not given in the
contract, the buyer can assert any defense he has against an assignee of the
note, stripping him of his protection as a holder in due course. This is not
a "cooling off" period nor does it give the buyer any right to avoid the sale.
It merely prevents a seller from assigning away an installment sales note
to a holder in due course where a known defense exists. Thus, only in this
very limited situation is negotiability impaired. If, however, the consumer
fails to give the necessary notice of a defense to the seller called for in the
contract, this provision offers him no protection against a subsequent holder
in due course. Although this amendment shows a recognition of the prob-
lem, the protection granted is quite inadequate in light of historical treat-
ment of the problem and legislation in other states.
In the past the courts themselves have. made some judicial inroads into
the finance companies' fortress of protection. The first of these was Com-
mercial Credit Company v. Childs, in which the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas held that where a finance company supplies the promissory note
forms which contains a printed assignment to it, and prepares the instru-
49 E.g., ten days in Mass. See, id.
50 Ill. S.B. 25, § 2D.
51111. S.B. 25, § 2D,
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ment, they are so closely connected with the transaction as to be a party
to it and not an innocent purchaser for value.52 This active participation
doctrine received some support,5 3 but -the majority :of American courts,
under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, have held that the
finance companies become holders in due course even if they furnished
forms.5 4 The Uniform Commercial Code requires actual knowledge of a
defense to prevent one from becoming a holder in due course; 55 this freely
allows finance companies to assume this status since participation in the
transaction is mere constructive notice and therefore no impediment. This
of course places the buyer at a disadvantage for he may have to continue
paying on the note although he may never have received the goods or may
have received defective goods.
The basic policy decision to be made is which of the two innocent parties,
holder or consumer, must bear the risk of loss if the seller absconds or de-
clares bankruptcy. Although protection must be given to the transferee of
negotiable paper to insure its free acceptance as a money substitute, there
is no overriding public interest for allowing consumer paper to be negotiable
at all.56 The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code recognized this
problem and included in the 1952 Edition of the Uniform Commercial
Code an objective test of good faith by requiring compliance with the
''reasonable commercial standard of any business in which the holder may
be engaged."157 This would have prevented a bank or finance company from
blindly shutting their eyes to facts which indicated that there was fraud
involved in the original transaction and still obtain the protection of a
holder in due course. But the provision was deleted in the final draft because
it was thought to reduce the certainty of negotiability. Illinois' old chattel
mortgage statute provided that this type of credit instrument would not
be negotiable as it was frequently used in the purchase of farm equipment
and the legislature desired to preserve the farmers' defenses.58 Seven states
52 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
53 See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Match Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766,
214 P.2d 819 (1950) ; Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).,
54 See generally Comment, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course
of Consumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 389 (1960); Note, Finance
Company as Holder in Due Course, 15 Ky. L.J. 134 (1926).
55 UNIFORMe COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (25).
56 See Mindell, Some Major Legal Problems in the Installment Field, 20 PE s. FIN.
L.Q. 52 (1966); King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 DIcK. L. Rav. 207 (1961).
57 UNIFOR. COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201-(19) (1952 version).
5s8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 § 26 (1955). Later repealed by the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code in 1961.
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have included in their retail installment sales acts a total prohibition against
the seller's requiring th buyer to execute a negotiable promissory note.5 9
Hawaii requires that any note executed in conjunction with a retail install-
ment contract have printed or written on its face the words "consumer
note" 60 and is not to be considered negotiable paper. The proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Code prohibits the taking of a negotiable instrument as
payment of a debt, but if a note is taken it may be enforced by a holder
in due course according to its terms.61
PROTECTION GIVEN THE CONSUMER IS INSUFFICIENT
Under Illinois' new provision, a buyer can assert a defense to a nego-
tiable instrument only if written notice is given to the assignee within the
required five day period, after delivery of the goods. It seems strange, that
at any time, a consumer can be required to continue to make payments
despite the existence of a valid defense. The historical reason for negotia-
bility, that of insuring the free flow of credit, is not applicable to consumer
paper. Only rarely does such paper travel to anyone but a commercial
company whose sole business is the discounting and collection of such paper.
Often they have reserves for just such losses should they occur. As an Assis-
tant Attorney General of New York writes:
It is a sad commentary on commercial life that an assignee, holder of installment
paper, must find it necessary to insulate himself from his own assignor's (dealer's)
conduct. It is the financial institution which gives the dealer business life in the first
place and then benefits from the sales transaction. Therefore it has a prime responsi-
bility to the consumer of such dealer to bear the consequences of the sale.62
The imposition of such liability would force the banks and finance companies
to make thorough investigations of the merchants with whom they deal. The
legitimate dealer would not be harmed since he fulfills the duties required
of him. But the effect would be to force the "shady operator" to conform
to ethical business practices under threat of losing his source of financing.
Under the new provision any defects arising after the five day period would
be without a remedy. Too much affirmative action is required on the part
of the consumer, for those who most need the protection are the most likely
to be negligent in giving the required notice.
59 See CURRAN, TREis n CONSUMER LEGSisr.rToN 312-22, chart 19 (1965).
60 HAWAII REv. LAWS, Act 285 § 19 (1967).
61 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.403.
02 Mindell, supra note 56.
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
The new Illinois amendments also include much needed reforms in regu-
lating collection methods and forfeitures. It provides that if any sale is
conditioned upon the obtaining of a favorable credit rating and the seller
rejects the buyer's credit application, the seller can no longer keep any of
the down payment as liquidated damages or investigation fees. 63 This will
eliminate the practice of taking a down payment from everyone and later
rejecting a person for poor credit, but still keeping the down payment.
Badgering techniques used by collection agencies are also curtailed. A
spouse of the debtor may not be contacted or further harassed unless the
spouse actually co-signed the obligation, or the obligation is in default for
thirty days or more, or unless the spouse would be liable to pay under other
statutes or common law. 64 Nor can the debtor's employer be contacted unless
he is in default for at least thirty days, and five days notice is given of
such intention. 65 If this last provision is violated the consumer is given a
right to civil damages, to compensate for the injury suffered. These attempts
to eliminate some of the savage tactics used to collect a debt add much to
the total protection given the consumer.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois amendment to its Consumer Fraud Act marks the end of a
long trail of legislative efforts started, according to the Chicago Sun-Times,
on February 6, 1960, when a Chicago west-side laborer took poison. He was
reported to have told his friend that he intended to commit suicide "because
he was tired of being hounded by his creditors. '6 6 In response to the uproar
this incident created, these credit reform measures were enacted. They are
a great step forward in equalizing the consumer's position and providing him
with vital protection. But the measures are neither strict enough nor suf-
ficiently inclusive. Besides rephrasing any other minor additions previously
mentioned, the reform should go further and prevent consumer paper from
becoming negotiable, and eliminate confessions of judgment. Illinois is one
of the very few states allowing confession of judgment, the majority declar-
ing them void as against public policy.67 Most frequently these cognovit
clauses are merely part of the fine print and not bargained for. There seems
63111. S.B. 25 § 2H.
64 In. S.B. 25 § 21.
65 111. S.B. 25 § 21.
66 Chicago Sun-Times, June 27, 1967, p. 30, col. 1.
67 See CURRAN, supra note 59.
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little reason to put the consumer at such a procedural disadvantage. 68 Should
these two amendments be enacted, Illinois' consumer protection laws would
even more effectively abate fraudulent sales practices.
William Kucera
68 Legislation was proposed in the 1967 session to eliminate confessions of judgment
but it failed to pass. See S.B. 28, 75th Ill. Gen. Ass. (1967).
